The Cyprus Crisis and Cold War USSR duplicity versus Us realpolitik (1974-1977) - Işık Kitabevi
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The Cyprus Crisis and Cold War USSR duplicity versus Us realpolitik (1974-1977)


 

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Makarios Drousiotis / Alfadi
Genre: Cyprus Books

orchestrated a coup in Cyprus, ousting its elected president, Archbishop Makarios. Five days later, Turkey invaded and occupied 36% of the island, expelling the local Greek Cypriot population from the areas it occupied, and gradually accommodating the entire Turkish Cypriot community from all over Cyprus. Almost 40 years on, the status quo created in 1974 remains unchanged. This book deals with the policies of the Great Powers (the US, the USSR and the UK) towards the Cyprus crisis, from the day of the coup until Makarios’ death on August 3, 1977. The author, after thorough archival research in the U.S. and Britain, offers a completely new perspective on the policy of the Great Powers vis-à-vis the Cyprus crisis of 1974 and challenges the widely held view, embedded especially in Greece and Cyprus, that it was a NATO-led conspiracy. The book highlights the gargantuan efforts by the British Foreign Secretary James Callaghan to reverse the first phase of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus on July 20, and then to prevent the second phase on August 14. The book argues that the main reason for Callaghan's failure was the U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s unwillingness to exert effective pressure on Turkey, because of its significance to Western security in the crisis-ridden Middle East. One novel – and crucial value of this study is its inclusion of the Soviet Union’s role in the crisis. This focus, based on the author’s fresh and original research, leads to some surprising – some would say uncomfortable – conclusions. The book documents Moscow’s tolerance of the Turkish invasion because it believed it would neutralize the risk of union (Enosis) of Cyprus with Greece. Greece’s withdrawal from NATO and the U.S. embargo on arms sales to Turkey in the wake of the coup and invasion undermined the cohesion of the Alliance on its southeastern flank.

 
2. Hamur, karton, 432 pages, 2016
ISBN: 9789963773886